插件名称	DocoDoco Store Locator
Type of Vulnerability	Authenticated file upload vulnerability
CVE Number	CVE-2025-10754
Urgency	High
CVE Publish Date	2025-10-15
Source URL	CVE-2025-10754

Urgent Security Advisory: Authenticated Arbitrary File Upload Vulnerability in DocoDoco Store Locator (Versions ≤ 1.0.1)

Date: October 15, 2025
作者： Managed-WP Security Team

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Attention WordPress site owners, agencies, and developers: a critical vulnerability (CVE-2025-10754) has been disclosed affecting the DocoDoco Store Locator plugin versions 1.0.1 and below. This flaw allows authenticated users with Editor privileges or higher to upload arbitrary files—potentially enabling remote code execution. At the time of this notice, no official patch has been released by the plugin vendor.

As U.S.-based security experts specializing in WordPress protection, Managed-WP offers this comprehensive analysis of the risk, exploitation methods, detection techniques, remediation strategies, and best hardening practices. We also highlight how deploying a Web Application Firewall (WAF) can provide critical protection during this vulnerable window.

This advisory is crafted in clear, expert-level language with actionable guidance—please review carefully and act promptly if you utilize this plugin.

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Executive Summary for Site Administrators

• The DocoDoco Store Locator plugin (≤ 1.0.1) contains an authenticated arbitrary file upload vulnerability exploitable by users with Editor roles or higher.
• An attacker with Editor access could upload malicious PHP files, such as webshells, enabling full site compromise including remote code execution and data exfiltration.
• No vendor fix is yet available. Immediate mitigations include plugin removal or deactivation, restricting Editor upload permissions, comprehensive file scans, credential rotations, and deploying WAF-based virtual patching.
• Managed-WP customers can enable a tailored WAF rule to block suspicious upload attempts targeting this plugin.

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Why This Vulnerability Is Critical

Arbitrary file upload vulnerabilities rank among the most severe threats for CMS platforms due to their ability to grant direct server access. Key concerns include:

• Execution of malicious PHP backdoors or webshells leading to full site control.
• File obfuscation techniques such as double extensions or misleading filenames to evade detection.
• Editor role privileges typically provide sufficient access to upload and manipulate site content, creating a significant attack surface.
• High likelihood of automated scans targeting unpatched sites, increasing exploitation risk exponentially.

Despite requiring Editor-level privileges, this vulnerability facilitates a complete site takeover vector in the hands of an attacker.

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Overview of Exploitation Steps

1. The attacker gains Editor-level access (via credential theft, social engineering, or other means).
2. They use the plugin’s upload interface or API endpoint to upload a malicious file.
3. Lack of proper file type validation and storage path protections allows executable files to be uploaded to web-accessible locations.
4. The malicious payload is invoked remotely, enabling arbitrary command execution or backdoor deployment.

We refrain from sharing specific exploit code publicly to reduce further risk; instead, we focus on detection and mitigation.

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Immediate Incident Response Actions

If your site runs DocoDoco Store Locator ≤ 1.0.1, execute the following steps without delay:

1. Place your site into maintenance or limited access mode to reduce exposure.
2. Temporarily deactivate or uninstall the plugin. If immediate removal isn’t feasible, rename its directory to disable code execution:
   Example via SSH:
   sudo mv wp-content/plugins/docodoco-store-locator wp-content/plugins/docodoco-store-locator.disabled
3. Force password resets for all Administrator and Editor accounts—and any users with upload or publishing permissions.
4. Revoke and reissue any API keys or integration credentials associated with the site.
5. Rotate WordPress authentication salts and keys in wp-config.php to invalidate sessions.
6. Conduct thorough scans of wp-content/uploads and other writable directories for unexpected or suspicious files.
7. Audit user accounts for unfamiliar additions created after this vulnerability was publicized; remove any unauthorized users.
8. Check for unauthorized modifications to scheduled tasks (wp-cron), theme/plugin files, .htaccess， 和 wp-config.php.
9. If compromise indicators are found (e.g., webshells or backdoors), isolate the environment and engage professional incident response support immediately.
10. Restore from a verified clean backup if remediation is uncertain.

Managed-WP users should enable our virtual patching WAF rules immediately while conducting remediation to mitigate active threats.

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Detection & Hunting Techniques

Use the following commands and checks tailored for server environments to identify signs of compromise or malicious uploads:

Scan recent files in uploads directory:

• List files modified within the last 30 days:
  find wp-content/uploads -type f -mtime -30 -printf '%TY-%Tm-%Td %TT %p
' | sort -r
• Find PHP or suspicious extensions:
  find wp-content/uploads -type f \( -iname '*.php' -o -iname '*.phtml' -o -iname '*.php5' -o -iname '*.php7' \) -print
• Locate files containing PHP tags:
  grep -R --line-number --exclude-dir=cache --exclude-dir=logs '<?php' wp-content/uploads || true
• Identify files with double extensions or executable suffixes:
  find wp-content/uploads -type f -regextype posix-extended -regex '.*\.(php|phtml|php5|php7|phar|pl|py)$' -print

Check recently modified core and theme/plugin files:

• find . -type f -name '*.php' -mtime -30 -printf '%TY-%Tm-%Td %TT %p
' | sort -r

List user roles and registrations (using WP-CLI):

• wp user list --fields=ID,user_login,user_email,roles,user_registered

Inspect active plugins:

• wp option get active_plugins

审查 .htaccess for suspicious rules or redirects:

• tail -n 200 .htaccess

If possible, utilize automated malware detection tools that inspect PHP files for shell signatures and anomalous code. Quarantine suspect files and restore clean versions from backups.

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Short-Term Mitigations

Implement these immediate controls while awaiting an official patch:

1. Disable or uninstall the plugin to halt exploit opportunities.
2. Prevent executable PHP file execution in the uploads directory:
   • On Apache, add a .htaccess file under wp-content/uploads with:

     <FilesMatch "\.(php|phtml|php5|php7|phar)$">
       Deny from all
     </FilesMatch>

   • On Nginx, configure appropriate location blocks to deny PHP execution; consult your host if necessary.
3. Temporarily remove the upload_files capability from the Editor role:

   wp role remove-cap editor upload_files

   Note this reduces Editor functionality; notify content teams accordingly.

4. Enforce MIME type restrictions and blocking of suspicious content at the WAF or plugin level.
5. Block access to plugin-specific upload endpoints via WAF rules, limiting to trusted admins or IPs.
6. Enable strict file inspection on all uploads and monitor logs for unusual requests or failed upload attempts.

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Recommended WAF Rule Concepts

Security teams or Managed-WP operators should consider implementing the following virtual patching rules:

1. Block upload requests to /wp-content/plugins/docodoco-store-locator/*upload* unless originating from Administrator users or trusted IP lists.
2. Reject file uploads containing PHP open tags (<?php) or obfuscated payloads in multipart requests.
3. Deny filenames with double extensions or executable suffixes matching regex patterns such as /\.(php|phtml|phar|pl|py|exe|sh)$/i.
4. Enforce strict MIME sniffing to ensure declared MIME types match file headers; block mismatches.
5. Block suspicious user agents or automated scanners performing repeated upload attempts on vulnerable plugin endpoints.
6. Log and analyze unusual content-type headers such as application/octet-stream posted to image upload endpoints.

Test all WAF rules in detection mode initially to calibrate and prevent false positives. Coordinate with hosting providers for aggressive measures.

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Long-Term Developer Fixes

Plugin maintainers and developers should apply these secure coding best practices to address this class of vulnerability:

1. Strict capability checks: 使用 当前用户可以（） with appropriate capabilities (e.g., upload_files 或者 manage_options) to authorize upload actions.
2. Nonce validation: All state-changing requests must verify WordPress nonces via wp_verify_nonce().
3. Core upload APIs: Employ wp_handle_upload() 和 wp_check_filetype_and_ext() to benefit from WordPress’s built-in secure file handling.
4. Restrict allowed file types: Limit accepted types to only those necessary (e.g., images), verifying both extension and content.
5. Store files safely: Save uploads outside the web root if possible, serving files via secure proxies or controlled URLs.
6. Filename sanitization: Remove unsafe characters and prevent directory traversal attacks using sanitize_file_name().
7. Prevent execution: Configure server or .htaccess rules to block execution of uploaded PHP or executable files.
8. Comprehensive logging: Track user actions and file uploads for forensic purposes.
9. Rate limiting and anti-automation: Enforce limits and CAPTCHA protections on upload endpoints to deter abuse.
10. Security testing: Implement automated unit tests to validate rejection of malicious payloads and monitor for regressions.

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Post-Incident Cleanup Checklist

1. Place the site in maintenance and create full backups (files and database) for forensic review.
2. Quarantine affected environments to prevent ongoing damage.
3. Follow hunting procedures to identify malicious files, unauthorized users, and altered code.
4. Replace or reinstall any modified core, theme, or plugin files from trusted sources.
5. Remove unauthorized users and invalidate all active sessions:
   wp user session destroy <user-id>
6. Reset all administrative and Editor passwords; update external credentials (FTP, hosting, APIs).
7. Rotate authentication salts and keys in wp-config.php.
8. Re-scan the environment after cleanup.
9. If restoring from backups, verify they precede the compromise and implement hardening measures immediately.
10. Monitor logs and traffic for signs of reinfection.

When in doubt, engage professional incident response teams or hosting security specialists.

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Monitoring & Detection Recommendations

• Enable audit logging of login events, role changes, and file uploads.
• Implement file integrity monitoring on plugin, theme, and uploads directories.
• Watch for suspicious outbound connections indicating potential command-and-control communication.
• Alert on creation of PHP files in uploads or other writable directories.
• Regularly validate content integrity comparing against known clean baselines.

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The Importance of Virtual Patching (WAF)

Without an official patch, virtual patching through a Web Application Firewall offers essential interim defense:

• Blocks exploit attempts in real time, reducing risk substantially.
• Is deployable immediately, buying time for patch development and testing.
• Avoids direct modification of vulnerable plugin code, preserving site stability.

Managed-WP strongly recommends running tailored WAF rules focusing on upload endpoints, content sniffing, and known exploit vectors—initially in monitoring mode before enforcing blocks.

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Defense-in-Depth Hardening Checklist

1. Remove or disable the vulnerable plugin if not required.
2. Apply WAF rules targeting suspicious uploads and plugin-specific endpoints.
3. Prevent execution of PHP and scripts inside the uploads directory.
4. Temporarily remove upload capabilities from Editor roles until patched.
5. Enforce password resets for Editors and Administrators.
6. Rotate authentication salts, keys, and external credentials.
7. Review and enable audit logging.
8. Use only trusted, updated themes and plugins.
9. Maintain regular, tested offsite backups.
10. Consider multi-factor authentication for all admin/editor accounts.

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Risk Prioritization Based on Site Exposure

• High Exposure: Sites with multiple Editor accounts, user-generated content, or high-traffic must act immediately—remove the plugin, enable WAF protections, and audit thoroughly.
• Medium Exposure: Sites with a limited number of trusted editors can coordinate remediation steps carefully with content teams but should not delay protections.
• Low Exposure: Even sites with a single administrator should not rely on perceived low risk and must apply necessary mitigations.

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Sample Secure Upload Handling Code for Developers

Below is a simplified example illustrating secure upload verification and handling. This is a conceptual starting point, not a complete patch.

<?php
// Secure upload handling example (simplified)
if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) {
    exit;
}

add_action( 'admin_post_my_plugin_upload', 'my_plugin_handle_upload' );

function my_plugin_handle_upload() {
    if ( ! current_user_can( 'upload_files' ) ) {
        wp_die( 'Insufficient privileges', '403' );
    }

    if ( ! isset( $_POST['my_plugin_nonce'] ) || ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['my_plugin_nonce'], 'my_plugin_upload' ) ) {
        wp_die( 'Invalid nonce', '403' );
    }

    if ( empty( $_FILES['file'] ) ) {
        wp_redirect( wp_get_referer() );
        exit;
    }

    $file = $_FILES['file'];

    // Limit to images only in this example
    $allowed_mime_types = array( 'image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif' );
    $finfo = wp_check_filetype_and_ext( $file['tmp_name'], $file['name'] );
    if ( ! in_array( $finfo['type'], $allowed_mime_types, true ) ) {
        wp_die( 'Invalid file type', '403' );
    }

    $overrides = array( 'test_form' => false );
    $movefile = wp_handle_upload( $file, $overrides );

    if ( isset( $movefile['error'] ) ) {
        wp_die( esc_html( $movefile['error'] ), '500' );
    }

    // Optional: create attachment or custom post
    // ...

    wp_redirect( wp_get_referer() );
    exit;
}
?>

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Communication Strategy for Teams

• Alert content teams to potential temporary loss of upload capabilities for Editors.
• Plan maintenance windows for plugin removal or updating to minimize operational disruption.
• Keep stakeholders updated on remediation progress and any incident findings.

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Managed-WP: Immediate, Layered Defense for Your WordPress Site

For organizations seeking rapid, set-and-forget protection as they remediate, Managed-WP offers robust Web Application Firewall solutions delivering virtual patching, continuous monitoring, and threat blocking—no-cost entry-level plans available for essential coverage.

Enable this automatic protection layer today to block malicious uploads, scanning for OWASP Top 10 threats, and maintain uptime while addressing vulnerabilities proactively. Learn more and sign up here: https://my.wp-firewall.com/buy/wp-firewall-free-plan/

(Advanced plans expand capabilities with automated malware removal, sophisticated IP filtering, and detailed monthly security reporting.)

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Final Recommendations (Prioritized)

1. Remove or disable the vulnerable DocoDoco Store Locator plugin immediately.
2. Activate Managed-WP WAF virtual patching rules to block exploit attempts targeting this plugin.
3. Scan uploads and other writable directories for suspicious files and remediate promptly.
4. Rotate all credentials, enforce strong passwords, and enable multi-factor authentication for admin/editor accounts.
5. Only restore Editor upload capabilities once the vulnerability is fully patched and your site integrity confirmed.
6. Subscribe to Managed-WP vulnerability alerts and patch notifications to stay ahead.

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We’re Here to Support You

If you are a Managed-WP customer, contact our security team to deploy a fine-tuned virtual patch blocking exploit attempts against this vulnerability immediately. Not yet a customer? Sign up for our free plan to gain vital protection during your remediation period: https://my.wp-firewall.com/buy/wp-firewall-free-plan/

Remember: attackers automate exploitation of public vulnerabilities. Acting swiftly is your most powerful defense.

— Managed-WP Security Team